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Abstract
This article offers a historical overview and critique of cybercafés 
in China. Four phases of development are introduced: the initial 
“technological enlightenment” phase of the late 1990s; the turbulent, 
“crackdown” years after 1999; the new growth period of 2004–2008; 
and the latest phase of consolidation since 2009. By reviewing the 
key incidents, players, and official statistics, this paper goes beyond 
the popular issues of gaming and crackdowns to offer a more com-
prehensive contextualization and explanation. It interrogates the 
relationship between the cybercafé and the community, and offers 
analysis of three fundamental issues—job creation in the community, 
affordable leisure activities, and youth socialization beyond family. 
Results from a news discourse analysis are then presented to show 
how the Chinese press reported on cybercafés from 2000–2009, how 
their news frames changed, and alternative modes of understanding 
and operating cybercafés. The paper concludes by presenting the 
broader implications for community informatics in China that can 
be drawn from the examination of cybercafés.
Introduction
The cybercafé—usually called wangba 网吧 (“net-bar” in Chinese)—is ar-
guably the most important venue for Internet access in China’s urban and 
rural communities. Despite a humiliating decline in status—they were 
considered temples of enlightenment in the 1990s but are now character-
ized as dangerous dungeons of Internet addiction—cybercafés remain a 
crucial pillar of community in China’s emerging network society in terms 
of infrastructure, service provision, and sociocultural innovation (Qiu, 
2009). As of July 2012, 138.8 million Chinese citizens—25.8 percent of 
122 library trends/summer 2013
total Internet users in China—patronized cybercafés on a regular basis 
(CNNIC, 2012). This number is equivalent to 56.6 percent of the Inter-
net-user population in the U.S. and more than all the Internet users in 
Japan and Turkey combined.1
 This massive phenomenon has received, however, scant scholarly atten-
tion in information management and community studies, in part because 
cybercafés in China are almost all privately operated businesses. Due to 
the widespread stigmatization of cybercafés as spaces of crime and addic-
tion (Golub & Lingley, 2008; Lindtner & Szablewics, 2010), they receive 
no public funding or official blessing. They almost exclusively serve those 
with fewer resources, mostly youth and migrant workers, generating unim-
pressive profits through “entertainment” services such as gaming, which 
may not look “informational” enough for serious examination.
 They are, nonetheless a critical element of community informatics in 
contemporary China, whose technological modernization is as remark-
able as the corrosion of its traditional communal ties. Capitalist expan-
sion, increasing social inequality, the one-child policy, the rise of IT as 
a leading industrial sector, and the continuation of one-party rule have 
all contributed to the rise, fall, and persisting centrality of cybercafés in 
Chinese communities. Can cybercafés help repair the ties that bind in the 
digital domains of community informatics? Or are they merely a reflection 
of a hopeless reality, where neither inclusion, nor the organic reconstruc-
tion of Chinese communities, can ever be achieved?
 This article addresses these broad questions by offering a historical cri-
tique of the cybercafé in China—its key events, players, business models, 
regulatory structures, and the rise and ebb of what could be called the 
cybercafé moral panic. Data and materials for this analytical synthesis are 
drawn from official statistics and archives, industry reports, and journal-
istic coverage, as well as “observation” and interview” field trips to more 
than one-hundred cybercafés in urban and rural China conducted since 
the late 1990s.
Historical Overview
Cybercafés appeared in China in 1996, one year after commercial Inter-
net service first became available to the Chinese public. Since then, the 
short history of the cybercafé has been full of twists and turns, much more 
so than that of other wired or wireless IT services in the country. This is 
because, as in most countries (Liff & Laegran, 2003; Mutula, 2003; Wake- 
ford, 2003; Adomi, 2007; Yesil, 2007), China’s cybercafé business tends 
to be small scale, serving those with fewer resources—such as youth, mi-
grants, and rural residents.
 Why do cybercafés remain mostly microenterprises, despite the efforts 
of the Chinese authorities to transform cybercafés into larger-scale na-
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tionwide chain stores (Qiu & Zhou, 2005)? Besides the usual economic 
explanations, two historical reasons stand out. On the one hand, cyber-
cafés descended very quickly from an upper-class to a working-class form 
of information and communication technology (ICT). The notion of 
“working-class ICT” refers to a range of technological devices and services, 
often operated by microentrepreneurs and their employees, that serve 
members of the lower classes—that is, the “information have-less,” which 
includes a wide variety of “low-income groups [who] populate an expan-
sive gray zone of the digital divide” (Cartier, Castells, & Qiu, 2005, p. 11). 
On the other hand, cybercafés depend on a wired Internet connection 
and by definition take root in concrete places, be they urban communi-
ties or rural villages. As a result, they become interwoven with community 
politics on the ground (Guo, 2003; Qiu, 2009) and are therefore of par-
ticular interest for community informatics. The cybercafé sector’s boom–
bust cycles are indeed catastrophic in commercial terms, but historically 
they reflect the internal dynamics of Chinese communities, the profound 
problems they face, and their resilience in an authoritarian context.
 China’s first cybercafés were called wangluo kafeiwu 网络咖啡屋, mean-
ing literally “Internet coffee houses.” In 1996, Info Highway Inc. 瀛海威
公司, China’s first Internet service provider (ISP), opened the most fa-
mous cybercafé at the time, Internet Science-Education Hall 网络科教馆. 
Located in the heart of Zhongguancun, Beijing’s main IT hub, it was the 
most prominent landmark of the early history of China’s Internet history. 
The name “Science-Education Hall” shows that its purpose was primar-
ily for public education about Internet-related scientific knowledge and 
skills. Designed to nurture a domestic Internet market, the main goal of 
this cybercafé was promotional, not profit making (Zhang S., interview, 18 
June 2008), although unlike most of China’s huge state-owned ISPs today, 
Info Highway was a private start-up with only RMB 80 million invested in 
it (Wu, 2004).
 Promotional cybercafés were soon followed by for-profit cafés, which 
basically prospered by buying Internet access wholesale and selling it re-
tail. Technical support was provided along with the occasional sales of 
Nestlé instant coffee, a popular gift item among the urban upper classes 
at the time. The overall business model was simple but quite lucrative 
because they mostly targeted wealthy foreigners, including tourists, and 
Chinese students seeking overseas education. In other words, until about 
2000, they were not to be found in ordinary communities of the big cities, 
let alone in small cities and the countryside.
 The turn of the century witnessed the rapid descent of cybercafés from 
being elite places of education, enlightenment, and global connectivity. 
Most of the new cybercafés fell into the category of the “mass-service net-
bar,” offering low-end entertainment, particularly gaming, but also online 
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chatting and video watching (Qiu, 2009). They emerged in all kinds of 
working-class communities, small towns, and rural areas, away from the 
prime real-estate districts (Guo, 2003; Ding, 2009).
 Official and popular discourse usually explains the downward drift in 
the context of a moral panic framework, within which illegal—that is, 
“black” cybercafés 黑网吧—became targets of law enforcement and high-
profile crackdowns (Qiu, 2009; Lindter & Szablewics, 2010). The most no-
torious was the fire at Lanjisu 蓝极速 cybercafé in Beijing in June 2002 that 
killed twenty-five young people, mainly college students. This remains the 
most deadly fire in the nation’s capital since the founding of the People’s 
Republic in 1949.
 The Lanjisu fire was undoubtedly tragic; yet so were the many crack-
downs that forced cybercafé owners into bankruptcy, resulting in opera-
tors being laid off and working-class users being cut off from the Internet. 
However, it is misleading to deem official crackdowns as responsive to il-
legal activities in cybercafés, for as we shall see, the crackdowns in fact 
contributed to the illegal activities. As national statistics demonstrate, de-
spite the rapid growth of Internet access in the country, the cybercafé user 
population became stagnant in 2000. It even decreased from 4.64 to 4.03 
million in the first half of 2001, long before the nationwide crackdown 
following Lanjisu in the second half of 2002 (figure 1).
 What happened? Two waves of crackdowns ensued, the first of which 
played a decisive role in the downturn of the cybercafé in China. Four 
phases in the history of cybercafés in China can be identified: (1) enlight-
enment, 1996–1999; (2) turbulence, 2000–2003; (3) new growth period, 
2004–2008; and (4) consolidation, 2009–2012.
 In summer 1999, Beijing began its campaign against the “cult” of Fa-
lun Gong 法轮功, which officials perceived as the biggest threat since the 
1989 Tiananmen movement. It severely strangled China’s media system as 
a whole (Zhao, 2003)—including cybercafés—because the Internet was 
“used extensively” by Falun Gong practitioners to transmit “confidential 
messages [that] were sometimes encrypted” (Tong, 2002, p. 647).
 One reason for the rise of Falun Gong was the collapse of the commu-
nity-based public health system (including both medical care and health 
information exchange) that had materialized over the Maoist decades. 
But the Falun Gong crackdown took a much higher route, impacting cy-
bercafés through ministry-level power bargaining. China’s first regulation 
of cybercafés, Announcement for the Standardization of Commercial Activities in 
Cybercafés and the Strengthening of Security Management 关于规范网吧经营行
为加强安全管理的通知, was promulgated in December 1998. It specified 
that the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)—namely, the police—would be 
the main regulator of cybercafés in the country. The original intention was 
to prevent Tiananmen dissidents from using the Internet. But the Falun 
Gong crackdown in the following year went beyond this motivation.
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 In April 2001, more than a year before the Lanjisu fire, the Ministry of 
Information Industries. (MII) also released its Measures for the Administra-
tion of Business Sites of Internet Access Services 互联网上网服务营业场所管理
办法. This document demonstrated the authorities’ deep concern about 
cybercafés. In comparison, since the fire there has been only one new na-
tionwide cybercafé regulation, promulgated in September 2002, namely, 
the Regulation on the Administration of Business Sites of Internet Access Services 
互联网上网服务营业场所管理条例. This last regulation established that 
the the Ministry of Culture (MoC) would assume the central role in su-
pervising all cybercafés in China (Qiu & Zhou, 2005).
 While the MPS is notorious for its heavy-handed campaigns and the MII 
for its bias toward the telecom industry, the MoC leadership is a sign that 
Beijing is attempting to maintain some balance between political control 
and commercial growth. The sidelining of both MPS and MII, at least 
in the national regulatory structure, led to an important consequence, 
namely, the preservation of the small-scale, community-based nature of 
cybercafé businesses. Although the MoC itself quickly evolved into a self-
interested force trying to “upgrade” cybercafés into nationwide chain 
stores, the attempt has been largely in vain. Today, China’s cybercafés are 
still mostly small, independent ones. The few significant chain stores are 
mostly regional, being located in the wealthy coastal areas, whose ties with 
MoC are tenuous.
 To contextualize this failure of top-down upgrading (a rare phenomenon 
given the country’s authoritarian rule), one should understand the strong 
Figure 1. The growth of cybercafé activity in China: cybercafé users as a percentage 
of total Internet users, and the total number of cybercafé users (source: compilation 
based on CNNIC (1999–2012).
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sense of entrepreneurship in Chinese communities from the bottom up. 
It is, however, misleading to stereotype Chinese people as naturally en-
terprising or to argue that their entrepreneurial energy, long suppressed 
in the Maoist era, finally erupted due to post-Mao marketization policies. 
Rather, the resilience of microenterprises results from the combination 
of at least four factors: (1) the tremendous communicative—including 
informational, entertainment, and social networking—needs among the 
lower classes; (2) the lack of alternative job opportunities for the lower 
social strata; (3) the rise of new commercial mass media, which failed to 
meet the needs of the lower classes but succeeded in popularizing the 
myth of a digital gold rush; and (4) the patron-client relationship between 
certain local authorities and cybercafé businesses, the latter being forced, 
formally or informally, to pay for protection.
 On the eve of the turbulent, or “crackdown,” phase, China’s most fa-
mous cybercafé entrepreneur was probably Wang Yuesheng 王跃胜, who 
started the Feiyu 飞宇 cybercafé in 1998. His business grew tremendously 
in the next two years, and the cybercafé soon expanded to occupy what 
had been ten shops, offering 1,500 computers and occupying 6,000 square 
meters of prime commercial space along the South Wall of Peking Uni-
versity (Gan, 2001). This was the largest-ever cybercafé in China—and 
possibly, in the world.2 It belonged to the first phase of cybercafé history 
in China, a brief phase of technological enlightenment and commercial 
boom that began to end in 1999.
 One year after the start of the Falun Gong campaign, Feiyu fell victim 
to the police crackdown because a few (around 5 percent) of its comput-
ers reportedly contained “pornographic information.” It was then sub-
jected to heavy fines, and eventually the premises were closed down in 
April 2001. Against the background of the second phase of cybercafé his-
tory, lasting roughly from 1999 to 2004, characterized by turbulence and 
a series of devastating events—the Falun Gong campaign, the crackdown 
following the Lanjisu fire, and the SARS epidemic3—the Feiyu enterprise 
never recovered.
 However, even during this turbulent phase, the cybercafé business 
experienced a “defiant upsurge” because urbanization and industrializa-
tion led to an outburst of communication needs among the lower classes, 
which were ignored by mainstream mass media. For instance, my cyber-
café interviewees in the early 2000s included many laid-off workers, who 
became either microentrepreneurs or café managers (known as wangguan 
网管) running cybercafé businesses.
 Another growth period followed between 2004 and 2008, when the 
official crackdowns became less pursued and less severe and cybercafé 
operators became more organized in their collective pursuit. Nationwide 
websites and online forums emerged for café operators such as Tian- 
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xiawangmeng 天下网盟.4 Regionally, there were more networks of opera-
tors based on face-to-face and telephone communication, which were ca-
pable of starting such collective actions as the strike in Lishui 丽水, where 
all cybercafés in the small city coordinated, and succeeded, in protesting 
the local police clampdown in November 2004. The largest collective ac-
tion during 2004–2005 was against the online gaming industry, especially 
Shangda 盛大, the most prominent gaming company in China at the time, 
because cybercafé operators thought the gaming industry was treating 
them unfairly. Online polemics flourished, resulting in skirmishes offline 
(Qiu, 2009).
 In 2007, the cybercafé surpassed the workplace to become the second-
most important place for Chinese Internet users to go online, following 
only home access (figure 2). This trend, however, lasted a mere two years 
until the end of 2008, when a new force emerged to undermine the cy-
bercafé business—namely mobile Internet access. By 2011, the cybercafé 
fell behind workplace access again to become the fourth popular mode of 
Internet access, while mobile-phone access continued to soar, including 
among lower-class Internet users.
 This last phase since 2009 has been marked by a steady decline of cyber-
café users relative to China’s Internet user population overall, while the to-
tal number of café users fluctuates around 140 million. At the end of 2008, 
cybercafés served 42.4 percent of all Internet users; this dropped to 25.8 
Figure 2. Five ways people access the Internet, shown as percent of all Internet users 
in China. (source: compilation based on CNNIC, 1999–2012).
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percent by June 2012. During the same period, the proportion of mobile-
phone users leaped from 39.4 percent to 72.1 percent. For cybercafé busi-
nesses, the diffusion of mobile Internet means not only more competition 
and thinner profit margins but also more consolidation in the market. 
On the one hand, the stores that have been doing relatively well are more 
likely to weather the storm. According to Tianxiawangmeng (2011), more 
cybercafés have formed their own chains in 2011, although independent 
stores still account for 63.16 percent of all cybercafés in China. On the 
other hand, gaming, video watching, and other immersive online experi-
ences delivered through a big screen have become further highlighted 
because mobile Internet still cannot compete on these services due to the 
physical constraints of mobile devices.
 Yet the most formidable change brought by mobile Internet is not the 
device or the further push to scale up. It is, in fact, the Chinese commu-
nities themselves now struggling to withstand the ultimate challenge of 
privatization and the disintegration of collective modes of communica-
tion. Without rediscovering community, cybercafés will become just an-
other business, obsessed with the soulless pursuit of profit, incapable of 
fending off crackdowns or market failures and doomed to end in oblivion. 
Where then is community—imagined or real—and the soul of the cyber-
café in China?
Cybercafé and Community
The award-winning journalist Paul Mason began his 2008 book in Gangxia 
岗厦, a crowded community of migrant workers in South China. In the 
early 1980s, Gangxia was a rural village. By 2003 it had become highly 
urbanized but, notwithstanding digital connections, without the public 
spaces that normally characterize urban life. As Mason (2008) observed:
In just 20 years Gangxia workers have built a community as tightly knit 
as in the fearsome slums that terrified English social reformers during 
the Industrial Revolution. The big difference is the total absence of a 
political public space. There is a chalk mural in Gangxia extolling the 
virtues of the People’s Liberation Army, but nothing else. The public 
area, such as it exists, is the mobile phone network or the Internet café, 
where each PC has a sticker on the monitor warning that “subversion” 
is a crime. (p. 6)
This Gangxia café is symptomatic of the larger issues facing not only cy-
bercafés but also contemporary Chinese communities in general. Globally 
speaking, increasing social inequality and rising population mobility have 
resulted in rapid urbanization, especially in the developing world (Taylor, 
Firth, Hoyler, & Dennis, 2010). An often-forgotten fact is that, for the new 
urban communities like Gangxia to emerge, many more rural communi-
ties in the hinterland, and often some older urban communities as well, 
had to lose people, resources, and independence. The emergence of the 
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cybercafé responds to the very different local contexts, catering to the 
needs of different social groups, creating centrifugal and/or centripetal 
forces that exacerbate existing propensities of the community.
 Cybercafés have sprung up in almost all communities in China, urban 
and rural, new and old, especially where the residents belong to the lower 
classes or come from mixed backgrounds. The challenges faced by com-
munities find expression through the cybercafés, which may also contrib-
ute to solving some of the thorny challenges. This is not easy because Chi-
nese communities are caught between the pressure of authoritarian rule 
and the atomizing effect of privatization. Combined, the two forces lead 
to decreasing public space in communities and eroding social networks 
among residents.
 The spread of cybercafés does not in itself alter the fundamental chal-
lenge posed by these two forces, which have devastated local communities 
as well as cybercafés. Yet as discussed below, the microenterprises can ad-
dress certain issues and generate partial solutions to the two fundamental 
challenges, thereby creating opportunities for community renewal and 
new collective formation, both digitally and tangibly.
 The first issue is unemployment, not only in rural communities but also 
old Maoist-style danwei 单位 communities that dominated Chinese cities.5 
By the time cybercafés became popular in the late 1990s, the rural-to-
urban exodus was well underway due to insufficient job opportunities in 
the countryside. The 1990s were also characterized by China’s neoliberal 
reform of state-owned enterprises and urban collective enterprises that 
led to the layoff of over 60 million employees between 1993 and 2006 
(Hurst, 2009, p. 1). The impact was nationwide on an entire generation of 
workers, which was particularly severe in traditional industrial zones such 
as Northeast China. Hence, despite official crackdowns, laid-off workers 
became a major social group who turned into cybercafé operators—own-
ers and employees—well into the 2000s. They hired migrants from small 
towns and rural villages to run the businesses. Considerable job opportu-
nities were created in the communities as well as in IT malls, which serve 
as regional cybercafé service centers. It is not uncommon for the IT malls 
to have a special section or entire floor just to sell and repair comput-
ers intended for cybercafé use. These new jobs are not only meaningful 
for migrants in destination communities; they add to the sustainability of 
older communities as well—for example, via remittances to families back 
home.
 According to MoC, by the end of 2009 there were 138,000 cyberca-
fés in China, generating 580,000 jobs (Guo, 2011). This does not include 
unregistered “black net-bars,” whose number is much higher. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that these jobs are more than economic opportunities. 
They challenge traditional notions of information exchange globally and 
of community information services in the Chinese context. Too often IT-
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sector jobs are seen as high-end, easily “outsourced” if not offshored, and 
conceptually very remote from residential communities (Carnoy, 2000). 
Meanwhile, when Chinese authorities plan to deliver community informa-
tion services—for example, through bulletin boards, public libraries, dis-
trict-level cultural stations (wenhuazhan 文化站), or wired radio broadcast 
systems (youxian guangbozhan 有线广播站)—their conception is usually 
confined to free-of-charge propagation by public-sector employees (Sun, 
2012).
 The wide diffusion of cybercafés means that IT-sector jobs can mate-
rialize within existing communities because they meet the needs of resi-
dents—including migrants as well as less-mobile residents—who are striv-
ing for economic opportunities. This is true for both café operators and 
typical users, including those who sometimes transform cybercafés into 
productive spaces. One example is the “gold farmers,” who turn cyber-
cafés into their “studios,” allowing them to accumulate and trade virtual 
currencies in online games for real-world profit (Heek, 2010). The scope 
of such “productive” activities remain limited, in part because official 
crackdowns have made cafés more vulnerable and operators have either 
chosen or were forced to use PCs without normal input equipment such 
as CD-ROM drives and USB plugs. The intention was to prevent customers 
from spreading “harmful” information such as dissident messages or com-
puter viruses. The result was that cybercafé PCs became a special species 
of computers optimized for entertainment use—using these machines for 
political or civic activities would be relatively difficult.
 However, once the pattern of the community-based IT economy be-
comes regularized, cybercafé PCs may still serve as the basis for sociopoliti-
cal formation as was the case in the Lishui cybercafé strike and the Uniden 
demonstration blogs. Lishui café operators successfully organized to resist 
a local state clampdown in 2004 (Qiu, 2009, p. 37). In the same year, Uni- 
den, a factory manufacturing electronic products for Wal-Mart, experi-
enced a major strike when workers made impressive use of cybercafés to 
publicize their account of the events through Weblogs (Qiu, pp. 193–195). 
Although these incidents were limited in scale, they demonstrate the po-
litical potential of cybercafés once members of the community are mobi-
lized to protect their collective interests.
 The second key issue is the lack of affordable leisure activity in urban 
and rural communities. Cybercafés throughout the country are used for 
online gaming, watching video, and online chatting (e.g., through QQ, 
China’s one-stop-shop for these and other activities). This has been true 
for most of the cybercafés’ short history. The popularity of these activities 
was among the main reasons why mainstream media often have associated 
cybercafés with “moral decay” and “addiction” (Golub & Lingley, 2008), 
although in the next section, closer examination of media reports will 
reveal an array of depictions.
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 This gives one cause to reflect: is leisure really a threat to community? 
Or, is the real culprit the excessive commodification and privatization of 
leisure, of which the cybercafé is but one symptom? Countless studies find 
that leisure activities are among the most effective and most time-honored 
ways of community building (Rojek, Shaw, & Veal, 206). Communal life 
often flourishes through singing, dancing, storytelling, drawing, sports 
games, and religious ceremonies. These activities are ritualistic as well as 
entertaining. They take place collectively in public space and across time. 
They strengthen communal ties between generations.
 In other words, leisure activities are integral to community life, and 
there is nothing intrinsically anticommunity in leisure. This does not dis-
miss the contention that commercialized cybercafé activities—including 
gambling, which sometimes becomes indistinguishable from gaming (Jiu, 
2005)—have indeed lured residents away from communal life. However, 
it is at least equally common to see cybercafés helping to create new social 
ties and renew old ones.
 A case in point is Feiyu, once China’s largest cybercafé, which, before 
its forced eviction, offered its Internet access free-of-charge from seven 
a.m. to nine a.m. each day. It created a new gathering space for everyone, 
rich or poor, educated or not, to explore the online world while getting 
to know each other; this came to include not only Peking University stu-
dents, the main population of the community, but also migrant workers 
from small businesses nearby. Similar arrangements existed in Shanghai 
and Chengdu, especially for young people. In Guangzhou, a cybercafé 
offered senior citizens free online hours, also early in the morning, when 
the most popular activities included playing chess online and e-mailing 
adult children overseas (interview, July 11, 2002). Although only a few 
of the cybercafés I visited offer such free services, in my interviews it was 
quite common for café owners to talk about their businesses as an integral 
part of the surrounding physical community, noting their belief that the 
leisure activities in their cafés energize the community at large while still 
generating revenue.
 Unfortunately, few of these more-community-minded cybercafés man-
aged to survive the combination of official crackdowns and vicious market 
competition, itself a “downward spiral” created by unfair power relation-
ships at the structural level (Qiu, 2009, p. 49). However, even cafés that 
are designed to maximize investment returns—and where the operators 
care nothing about community—cannot prevent individual users from 
supporting collective formations.
 One rural-to-urban migrant worker—referred to here as Mr. Z to pro-
tect his identity—went online in 2005 only through cybercafés for gaming 
and chatting, “to flirt with girls through QQ,” as he admitted. One year 
later, he lost a hand in an industrial accident in Shenzhen. In order to get 
legal compensation, he frequented cybercafés to look for state regulations 
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and seek help. Every time he finished an online session, he stored the use-
ful information in a folder under his QQ account. “This was very crucial,” 
he explained, “because I had no other way to remember the phone num-
bers, Web addresses, policy documents, and other cases relevant to mine. 
It is so humid and dirty [in the industrial zone] that no piece of paper 
could last very long” (interview, October 31, 2010).
 After nearly a year, Mr. Z had his case heard—with a successful out-
come. But his QQ folder became a collective resource as he began to offer 
free consultation to other victims of work injury. His reputation grew in 
the community, and a local labor NGO hired him to serve other workers. 
This NGO has its own online computers, meaning Mr. Z no longer needs 
to pay to use QQ in cybercafés. But his transition would have been impos-
sible without these cafés. As can be seen in this case, leisure activities not 
only create a gathering-place in community, but they may also pave the 
way for other informational, social, even political activities, once the com-
municative needs arise.
Youth socialization beyond the family, shaped by China’s one-child 
policy, constitutes the third major challenge for Chinese communities, 
urban or rural. Having children offers a fundamental, and indispensable, 
basis for the long-lasting vitality of communities. But having only one child 
per family changes the dynamics, particularly in a context of rapid com-
mercialization. In the cities, the “only-child community” (Nelson & Chen, 
2007) becomes the norm when families become more inward looking and 
ruthless academic competition among kids becomes the focus of collec-
tive attention.
 As Fengshu Liu discovered through in-depth interviews in a medium-
sized city in North China, children and young people visit cybercafés “of-
ten against the will of various authorities, for a sense of freedom, relax-
ation, community, and equality as well as fun, which can hardly be found 
elsewhere in their lives” (2009, p. 167). The strong attraction of cybercafé 
results from
a range of factors, such as their singleton status, high parental expec-
tations, the competitive educational and economic systems, the au-
thoritarian political culture, and the lasting influence of a hierarchical 
tradition that sees young people as juniors in both the family and society 
[and] tends to leave inadequate room for individual self-expression 
and social-political participation. (p. 172)
 In other words, cybercafés are magnets for youth, not just because of 
their digital services, which sometimes are of secondary importance, but 
because of the simple fact that they are among the very few “hangout 
spots” where young people can mingle without the pressure of school 
and family patriarchies. Most of these urban youngsters have comput-
ers at home, but these machines are under strict parental control. Their 
schools perhaps have even more computers, but the regulatory systems 
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there are even more draconian. If they have to find a “great good place” 
(Oldenburg, 1999) for their community in the digital era, the cybercafé, 
despite its problems, may be the closest possibility. Yet even these places 
are stigmatized and subject to crackdowns due to the moral panic created 
by the authorities and mass media (Golub & Lingley, 2008) and magnified 
through interpersonal channels in the community. At this moment, how-
ever, there is probably nothing at the community level that can substitute 
for cybercafés in Chinese cities as affordable places for youth socialization, 
especially in relation to the Internet, which has become such a center-
piece of urban youth life.
 The countryside, on the other hand, is increasingly characterized by 
communities of “left-behind” children (Bu, 2008), whose parents become 
migrant workers to earn disposable income in order for the kids to get 
a better education, even go to college, which has become increasingly 
expensive. Calculation based on the Fifth National Census shows that, by 
2000, there were more than 284 million “left-behind” children in rural 
China, whose parents (either one or both) had migrated for work (Duan 
& Zhou, 2006). The separation of parents and children (now taken care of 
by grandparents and other relatives) produces a very different landscape 
in rural communities, although the root causes—the one-child policy, ex-
cessive commercialization, fierce academic competition, authoritarianism 
in the family, and school—are similar to the issues urbanites face.
 Lower computer penetration in households adds to the popularity of 
cybercafés in rural communities, where young people have a strong mo-
tivation to “escape” from the culturally drained rural villages. In order 
to boost domestic consumption, the Chinese government has since 2007 
promoted its “electronic appliances to the countryside” (jiadianxiaxiang 
家电下乡) program (Lin & Wong, 2012). This has resulted in improved 
electricity supply and broadband access in rural communities, where cy-
bercafés have emerged in remote areas. However, when I visited some of 
these rural cybercafés in 2011–2012 in Hubei and Fujian, there was little 
change from my first visit to a café in 2002 in rural Sichuan. The rooms 
were dark, noisy, and full of adolescents playing online games while some 
were smoking cigarettes. The lack of change in these cybercafés is but one 
indicator of the deteriorating problem of youth development and unsus-
tainable communities in China.
 The remaining question is: could it have been otherwise?
Discourse Beyond Crackdown
This section examines Chinese press coverage of cybercafés in the first 
decade of the new century. Despite the increasing commercialization of 
the press, newspapers in China are under government control. They are 
therefore much more than simple reflections of public opinion. Rather, 
they are part and parcel of the larger state regulatory process, responding 
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also to demands in the news market itself. They influence policy making 
as well as social imagination, ultimately helping to shape the relationship 
between cybercafés and communities on the ground.
 When foreign media report on China’s cybercafés, the focus is usu-
ally on government crackdowns, which has become a stereotypical narra-
tive framework or “news frame” (Fairclough, 1995). Yet if we look at news 
within China, there are interesting differences. One the one hand, press 
coverage has indeed been a culprit for the cybercafé moral panic. On the 
other hand, press coverage also reveals considerable evidence of possibili-
ties beyond stigmatization. These are not idealistic plans for the future. 
They have existed in the past.
 Soon after cybercafés first appeared in China in the mid-1990s, news me-
dia played an effective role in popularizing the digital gold rush, persuad-
ing people that computers, the Internet, and cybercafés were all promis-
ing opportunities for the future of business. Mr. Wang Yuesheng started 
Feiyu in 1998, which later became the largest cybercafé in the country. He 
admitted that his strong interests in this “new economy” sector first came 
from “media propaganda” 媒体宣传 (Gan, 2001, p. 32).
 To capture historical change in media discourse, we systematically se-
lected 80 news reports from each of 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009, which add 
up to a total of 320 articles.6 Using the most comprehensive WiseNews 慧
科搜索 search engine, we identified twenty of the longest articles in the 
months of March, June, September, and December of the selected years, 
whose headlines contain the word “cybercafé” (wangba 网吧). The newspa-
pers included official party organs, market-oriented press, and trade news-
papers. We then imported the articles into the NVIVO analytical software 
to assist in our close reading and analysis. The results are four basic news 
frames as shown in table 1.
 The four basic frames are (a) industry growth: understanding cyberca-
fés from the perspective of economic development, including job creation, 
the hardware and software market, and the net-bar chains; (b) crackdown: 
reporting on incidents or regulatory changes increasing pressure upon 
cybercafés, administratively or financially, sometimes leading even to busi-
ness shutdown; (c) youth addiction: the holding of cybercafés responsible 
for the Internet’s mismanagement by their offering of addictive online 
gaming services; and (d) crime: characterizations of cybercafés as breed-
ing grounds for illegal activities from petty theft to drug use to organized 
crime.
 Both (c) and (d) provide moral justifications for crackdowns and more 
stringent regulation, meaning they are the closest to the “moral panic” 
news frames. But (c) and (d) only account for 18.13 and 4.69 percent of 
all articles, respectively; that is, altogether 22.82 percent, less than a quar-
ter of all reports. Although another 30.9 percent of all articles used the 
crackdown news frame, the combination of these three frames (b, c, and 
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d) represents slightly more than half (53.72 percent) of the press coverage 
overall.
 Surprisingly, industry growth is the most prevalent frame, representing 
32.5 percent of all articles. The percentage was the highest (57.5 percent) 
in 2003, the year that followed the Lanjisu cybercafé fire, when the crack-
down and moral panic frameworks only accounted for about one-third (35 
percent) of all coverage. In 2006, industry growth also represented nearly 
half (46.25 percent) of all reports. However, few articles used this industry 
growth frame at the beginning (2000) or end (2009) of the decade, show-
ing strong tendency of wax and wane over this period.
 The fluctuation of industry growth frameworks in the news coverage 
is particularly obvious when compared with the crackdown frame, which 
fairly consistently accounted for about one-third of total reports. It is 
important to note that, in 2000, 32.5 percent of all articles were about 
crackdowns in various parts of the country, demonstrating again that the 
authorities tightened control long before the 2002 Lanjisu fire. However, 
immediately after the fire, crackdowns only accounted for 21.25 percent 
of new stories in 2003, the lowest amount in the selected years.
 It is also interesting to look into the “unspecified” category, which was 
especially sizable (32.5 percent) in 2000. These articles contain “cyber-
café” in their headlines but do not use any of the four basic frames. Rather, 
they are more open, diverse, and unpredictable than the received ways 
of covering cybercafés. Their number was the highest in 2000; it dipped 
below 10 percent in the middle of the decade but increased again in 2009, 
moving in the opposite direction of “industry growth” articles.
 What are these more diverse ways of understanding cybercafés? One re-
port by China Women’s Daily (zhongguo funubao 中国妇女报) in March 2000 
Table 1. Discursive Frames for Cybercafé Press Coverage in Chinese Newspapers, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009
Frames
Year
Industry Growth Crackdown Youth Addiction Crime Unspecified
N
% of  
Annual 
Reports N
% of  
Annual 
Reports N
% of  
Annual 
Reports N
% of  
Annual 
Reports N





    9 11.25 26 32.50 16 2000   3 3.75 26 32.50
2003
N = 80
  46 57.50 17 21.25   7 08.75   4 50 0    6 7.5
2006
N = 80
  37 46.25 26 32.50   9 11.25   6 7.50   2 2.5
2009
N = 80
  12 1500 30 37.50 26 32.50   2 2.50 10 12.50
Total
N = 320
104%  32.5%0 99% 30.9%0 58% 18.13% 15% 4.69% 44% 13.75%
Source: WiseNews.
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is a typical “enlightenment” piece reflecting elite opinions of cybercafés as 
a progressive force in the first phase of Internet development in China. It 
reads in part, “Cybercafé is not a ‘wolf.’ The public should not be scared. 
Being an indicator of information society, the birth of the cybercafé and its 
existence should be praised as a positive development” (L. Zhang, 2000).
 Another article reported on a laid-off worker who started a “healthy” 
cybercafé in Guannan 灌南, a small town in northern Jiangsu Province. 
It was published in China Labor and Social Security News (zhongguo laodong 
baozhangbao 中国劳动保障报) in September 2000:
The 36-year-old Wang Jian used to work for Guannan Printing Factory. 
She was laid off in 1995. She then tried to run businesses in clothing and 
accessories. Since March, she has invested 120,000 yuan and purchased 
17 high-level microcomputers to start the largest, best-equipped, and 
fastest cybercafé in Guannan. From the very beginning, Wang Jian has 
positioned her cybercafé as a place with elegance, healthy content, 
knowledge, and fun. . . . By prioritizing social benefits as the goal of 
cybercafé development, Wang Jian saw the economic profits from her 
“Net-bar Global” increasing rather than decreasing. (C. Zhang, 2000)
There are not that many “alternative” reports like these, whose sig-
nificant presence was overwhelmed by mainstream news frames of large-
scale industry development, crackdown, and the inevitable “moral panic” 
frameworks. However, the very existence of these diverse perceptions and 
varied practices enables thinking beyond the usual stereotypes, which 
is precisely what we need to rethink the role of cybercafés in Chinese 
communities.
Concluding Remarks
Within the study of community informatics in China, the subject of cy-
bercafés is relatively new. Yet, as this article has described, cybercafés have 
gone through four different phases: the initial “enlightenment” phase 
of the late 1990s; the turbulent, “crackdown” years after 1999; the new 
growth period of 2004–2008; and the latest phase of consolidation since 
2009. By reviewing the key incidents, players, and official statistics, an at-
tempt has been made here to historicize and contextualize the develop-
ment of cybercafés in China beyond the single issue of crackdowns. The 
relationship between cybercafés and community has been critiqued, and 
explanations offered with regard to three fundamental issues at stake: 
job creation in the community, affordable leisure activities, and youth so-
cialization beyond the family. Results from a news discourse analysis were 
then presented to show how the Chinese press reported on cybercafés 
from 2000 to 2009 and how their news frames changed, and to suggest 
alternative modes of understanding and operating cybercafés.
 I have contended here and elsewhere that the value of our subject can-
not be fully appreciated unless we use a collective perspective to rethink 
 cybercafés in china /qiu 137
cybercafés as a “commons” for the “information have-less” (Qiu, 2009, pp. 
46–50). If we continue to constrain our thinking within the old frame-
works of gaming and crackdowns, based on the stigma that cybercafés 
are nothing but private businesses trying to profit from meaningless en-
tertainment, then community informatics in China will have little or no 
chance to enter the digital networked era. This is especially so in commu-
nities—urban or rural—where ICT ownership remains low, population 
mobility high, and where traditional institutions (governments and mass 
media, schools, and families) continue to fail in meeting the full spectrum 
of communicative needs of local residents, particularly the young.
 The cybercafé “commons” is not an unrealistic utopia. It is a vision 
rooted in the fact that the cybercafé has been the most popular mode 
of Internet access in China and around the world. Although the more 
community-minded cafés—which have offered free online hours and free 
computer training (like Feiyu)—have been driven to the margins, ordi-
nary cybercafés still offer a most affordable leisure space within the budget 
of the working classes and underclass. On this collective basis, cybercafé 
owners and individual users have also initiated new sociopolitical forma-
tions as seen in the Lishui café strike and the interview with Mr. Z. Al-
though authoritarian rule remains a decisive factor at critical moments of 
historical devolution in China and elsewhere (e.g., Yesil, 2003; Liu, 2009), 
and although traditional community keeps dissolving in the mundane 
business of privatization and profit maximization, new communal prac-
tices have begun to materialize in and around the cybercafé.
Notes
1. According to the official China Network Information Center (CNNIC), as of July 2012, 
China had 538 million Internet users. In comparison, at the beginning of 2012, the total 
population of Internet users in the United States is 245.2 million, Japan 101.2 million, 
Turkey 36.4 million.
2. The world’s largest cybercafé, verified by Guinness World Records in November 2008, 
is ChamsCity Digital Mall in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria, each offering 1027 computer 
terminals. See http:/ /www.guinnessworldrecords.com/records-1000/largest-internet 
-caf%C3%A9/.
3. SARS stands for severe acute respiratory syndrome. It was a pandemic that broke out 
between November 2002 and July 2003, affecting China most seriously, where people had 
to stay home and public spaces, including cybercafés, were deserted. However, comparing 
SARS with the 1999–2001 Falun Gong campaign, the former actually had a less severe 
impact on cybercafé business nationwide (see figures 1 and 2).
4. To be found online at: www.txwm.com.
5. See Bray (2005) for the evolution of danwei, or work-unit, in urban China. Danwei is a 
socialist urban organization providing employment as well as social welfare from cradle to 
grave for coworkers and their families, who live together in the same residential neighbor-
hood.
6. See Zhang, Wang, and Qiu (2013) for an extended version of this analysis.
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